The difference between theory and practice often rests on one major factor: efficiency. In distributed systems, communication is usually expensive, and protocols designed €or practical use must require as few rounds of communication and as small messages as possible.
Introduction
A quoi bon I'enfant qui vient de naitre?
Benjamin Franklin' (1783)
The biggest drawback to current theoretical research in cryptography is its general impracticality: while polynomially-bounded resources are mathematically satisfying, they are often effectively out of reach. In distributed computing, where communication speeds lag behind processor speeds, the number of rounds of communication and the message sizes are significant issues to consider. A factor of ten can mean the difference between utility and impracticality. Many solutions to secure multiparty function evaluation have been proposed [lo, 11, 9, 7, 8,4, 14, 2, 12, 6 , 51 but none seem easily implementable, despite a reasonable clarity in their description and a theoretically small requirement for resources. These methods normally rely on the share-compute-reveal paradigm, in which processors secretly share their inputs, run subprotocols to evaluate gates of a bounded fanin' arithmetic circuit CF that expresses the function F to compute, and reveal the final secret representing the output. Each subprotocol is an additiou or multiplication of secrets, and uses a constant number of rounds and a small polynomial number of messages. But an n2 factor or even a constant factor of twenty in a network of a hundred processors is debilitating. In Shamir's method for secret sharing, each processor i shares secret s by selecting a polynomial f(u) = a i d + ... + a l u + s with coefficients a h chosen uniformly at random over a finite field E , setting PIECE~(S) = f ( a j ) (where aj # 0 is an identifier for player j ) , and sending PIECE~(S) to player j for each j . Ben-Or, Goldwasser, and Wigderson point out that when the aj are selected carefully, the pieces of s turn out to be elements in a BCH code, and a unique secret is reconstructible despite up t o 1 changes, when t 5 Ln/3].
A natural advaiilage of using polynomials is that combining two secrets r and s to form a new secret q whose value is their sum is easy, and requires no interaction: each j sets PIECE;(q) +-P I E G E~( T )
+ P I E C E~( S ) .
If f ( u ) represents f(0) = r and g(u) represents g(0) = s, then h(u) = J ( u ) + g ( u ) represents h ( 0 ) = T + s. Multiplication by a publicly known constant is also easy: PIECE;(CS) = c PIECE~(S). Thus a new secret may be computed without having to reveal r and s.
When secrets are multiplied, however, problems arise: the degree of the polynomial h ( u ) = f ( u ) g ( u ) determined by the products of the individual pieces is 2 t , which soon grows out of hand. To deal with this problem, an interactive subprotocol for "degree reduction" is employed 17, Y]. We shall not present the solution here, but we shall give a brief outline in order to consider its resource requirements. Essentially, each processor is required to reshare PIECE;(T) and PIECE.(.S\ d o n s with a third secret c;, and must then prove interactively that c, = PIECE;(~)PIECE;(S). The players also jointly create several uniformly random secrets. Each player's piece of the new secret q = rs then becomes Whereas previous protocols employ a great deal of processing to protect against Byzantine (malicious, message-changing) adversaries throughout the execution of the protocols, our protocol requires no elaborate on-line protection during the body of the protocol. Malicious or random errors are easily detected by checking whether n points interpolate to a tth-degree polynomial. Byzantine failures are corrected directly using BCH decoding as in normal secret-reconstruction -interaction, proofs, private communication, Byzantine Agreement, and other special procedures are not necessary. In fact, it suffices that all nonfaulty players broadcast a message (broadcasts from faulty players can be incomplete or inconsistent; the players need not agree on the set of messages apparently broadcast).
In addition to reducing network requirements -Byzantine Agreement and private channels can be costly to implement -the body of our protocol (send public messages, do BCH error correction) is easy to implement using established software. The reduction in programming complexity lends a greater degree of confidence in the security of an implementation.
The cost and the savings. We achieve these improvements by preprocessing: but the preprocessing stage costs only one phase of muliiplication. The total number of rounds drops from S + D F M + 1 rounds to S + A1 + D F , a significant improvement of a factor of M over standard techniques. The total number of multiplications in our protocol remains exactly the same as in [7, 81, Appropriate repetitions prevent cheating; the dealer must cheat at many random points in order that his secrets be consistent. In the current work, A, and become corrections to a gate whose inputs (a + A,) and ( b + A,,) have been chosen uniformly a t random, and whose output d = (u + A,,)(b f As) has been pre~omputed.~ Multiplication of two real inputs a and 6 reduces to computing a correction to d that, in turn, reduces to a linear combination of a, 6, d, and the publicly revealed (but uniformly random) corrections A, and Ab.
One-time tables. We coin the term "one-time table" to describe a set of precomputed values that support direct secure computation without broadcast or private channels. This is analogous to a one-time p a d , which is a random sequence of bits permitting two parties to send arbitrary messages with perfect privacy over public channels. Our "circuit randomization" constructs a list of independent, secret products of independent, secret random numbers. This list depends on F only insofar as it must contain as many entries as there are multiplicative gates in a circuit for F -in the same way a one-time pad must contain enough bits to mask a given message. The cost of using an entry is one round of open communication and requires neither broadcast nor private channels. Thus, we propose the precomputation of a one-time table, using a few short and initial rounds of costly (broadcast or private) channels, as a general paradigm for secure protocol design.
Contents. We describe the protocol in 52, giving our main theorem in $2.2 and a proof sketch in 52.3. We discuss efficiency and practical issues in $3.
An Efficient Protocol for Circuit Evaluation
Fix n, the number of players; t ( n ) < n / 2 , a bound on the number of players who can be corrupted in a dynamic and malicious (Byzantine) way; E , a finite field such that IEI > R + 1; F , a function from En to E described by a polynomial-size circuit CF (without loss of generality, this covers finite functions from poiynomial bits to polynomial bits [with poly-size circuits] as well as the case where each player learns a private output);
and & I , . . . ,a,, primitive nth roots of unity over E. For the sake of exposition, we assume private and broadcast channels are available and that t ( n ) < n / 3 , but we note that our 31n [2], the symbols As and As appear as r and s, not to be confused with the use of r and 6 in this work.
techniques apply to any protocol based on the share-compute-reveal paradigm.
We employ the secret sharing (SHARE ), reconstruction (REC ), linear combination (LINEAR-COMBINE ), and multiplication (MULTIPLY ) protocols of [7] for t < n / 3 ; for n / 3 5 t < n/Z, methods of [14. Z] can be used. We refer the reader to [7, 8, 14, 21 for detailed descriptions. Before describing thc protocol, we note that Figure 1 gives a simple and well-known subprotocol UNIFSECRET to generate uniformly random secrets by adding uniformly random secrets shared by each party.
Player i sets r; t unifDrrn(E)
Player i shares ri.
Run LINEAK-COMBINE : T t C: =1 Ti. Assume also that there are gates gk E {+, x } of fan-in 2, and write XI: = gk(xik,Xjk) to mean that gate gk has inputs x i k and xj, and output i k k with ik,jk < The share-compute-reveal paradigm follows exactly this pattern, using subprotocols to evaluate gates at each level and thereby produce new secrets Xk, until the final secret X N is calculated. The result X N can then be reconstructed using REC . We shall take an analogous but somewhat different route.
Let us ignore secret sharing for the moment and focus on the values used in the calculation of I N = F(.rl,. . . , xn). But consider now the correclions A, = ri -xi to each wire. We begin the evaluation of Cp by computing the corrections to the inputs: A1 = r1 -11,. . . ,A, = Tn -In.
Given an additive gate gk = (+) with random inputs r i k , r j k , random output rk, and input wire corrections A l k , A j L , we can compute the correction Ak for the output wire A1; = r k -sk -A;, -A,,, because:
We may thus regard A, as a fineur combiiialion of previously calculated, "knownn ,-onstants A,, and A,, with the values rk and s k .
But more interesting, and crucial to our solution, is the observation that for multi- Now, note that because every i-g is uniformly random, every Ak value is dso uniformly random, regardless of the inputs. Thus, no information whatsoever is revealed by reconstructing the Ak values. The only reconstruction that contains nonrandom information is the reconstruction of the final output secret z~ = F ( z l , . . . , zn).
With this explanation in hand, the reader should be prepared to read Figure 2 , which describes the protocol. Note that the final level is computed differently because the secret I N does not need to be fed into a new, randornizcd gate.
An Optimization
With a simple optimization, additive layers in the circuit can be ignored, in the sense that they need not lead to interaction. We "compress" additive gates by computing the corrections to their outputs at the same time as the corrections to their input wires. In fact, no "randomization" of additive gates (secrec generation of R1, R2, and computation of S = R, + Rz during preprocessing) is needed.
Let us illustrate the technique with an esample. Let gate g s ( x l , s z ) = 5 1 5 2 , g t j ( z 3 , q ) = 5324, and g7(zS,q) = 2 5 + .rG. That is, the output of g7 is (~1~2 + 33x4).
Rather than go through two stages (mulliply, add), we need only one (multiply). Define A simple way to think of this is to set r , k = s,, and rlk = s j k for every additive gate sk = gk(r,k,r,k); then sk = r,k + t-,k = stk + s ,~, and the formula for A k depends only on the A values for the inpuls to g,k and g I r . The example given above generalizes in a natural way to give a general technique that "ignores" additive gates.
Main Results
The definitions of resilience -a combination of security and fault-tolerance -and of perfect and ezponential are given in 32.3. Proof. Referring to Figure 2 , step 1 requires S rounds, step 2 requires M rounds, step 3 uses ( D F -1) secret reconstructions, and step 4 uses one secret reconstruction. Earlier
Theorem 1 Let t ( n )
rounds. See $2.3 for a proof of resilience (security).
Let RANDCIRCUIT' denote the protocol obtained from RANDCIRCUIT by using secretsharing, addition, and multiplication protocols designed to withstand t < n/2 rather than 2 < n/3 faults, and let S',iM' be the number of rounds required by the corresponding su bprotocols. Proof. As in Theorem 1, the number of rounds used is S' + M' + D F ; existing methods for multiplication require n(t) rounds when t faults are possible, so the difference of ( D F -l)(M' -1) gives the savings reported. Because of the exponentially small chance of error in the secret addition and multiplication protocols, the resilience of our protocol is only exponential; but better resilience is shown impossible in [7] . 0
Using the optimization described in $2.1, we observe that the round complexity depends only on the multiplicative depth o€ a circuit CF for F . Let RANDCIRCUIT' denote the protocol obtained from RANDCIRCUIT by computing corrections to additive gates at the same time as the corrections to the multiplicative gates that feed them, as described in $2.1; "randomization" is not performed for additive gates. Let depth,(C) give the multiplicative depth of circuit C, and let d e p t h , ( F ) be the minimum over all polynomial-size bounded-fanin arithmetic circuits C F computing function F.
Theorem 3 For t ( n ) < n / 3 , protocof RANDCIRCUIT' is a perfectly t-resilient protocol f o r F against Byzantine adversarzes and requires only S + M + d e p t h , ( F ) rounds of interaction. An analogous result with ezponential reszlience holds f o r a protocol RANDCIRCUIT.'
designed for t ( n ) < nj2.
We remark that avoiding the randomization for additive gates reduces the message cornplexity = well; the UNIFSECRET protocol is called only for multiplicative gates, not for all 1%' gates in C F . Proof. The proof follows the lines of thc proof of Theorem 1. The improvement in round complexity arises from "compressing" additive gates as described in 52.1. 0
Proof Sketch
We adopt the security definitions of [2, 31. A brief sketch is included here for com-
pleteness. An ensemble P is a collection of distributions P ( t , k ) for .z E C* and k E N. The difference between distributions P and Q on finite domain X is 
ID(F), against 1-
Proof of T h e o r e m 1. We must find an interface that translates attacks on RANDCIRCUIT t o attacks on the ideal, trusted-host protocol ID(F) for F . Because initial messages (preprocessing steps 1 and 2) between nonfaulty players are not seen by an adversary, and because most messages created by nonfaulty players (whether sent to COTrupted players or seen when later corruptcd) are generated uniformly at random, subject to simple linear algebraic conditions and the input values and output value F ( x~, . . , ,x,,) , an interface is neither hard to design nor to prove correct. The following lemmas describe the responses that Z must make in order to supply A with a proper set of responses to corruption requests while at the same time inducing the same outputs in ID(F) that A induces in RANDCIRCUIT. Proof. Simple linear algebra. In the case of messages regarding A reconstructions, the "uniformly random polynomials" have uniformly random A values as their free terms.
In the case of messages regarding secretly-shared inputs or random secrets, a set of 1 messages to players in T is a uniformly random t-vector, whether it be generated from a uniformly random polynomial of degree t having free term 2, or from a uniformly random polynomial of degree t . Proof. Simple We have reduced the number of rounds of interaction by an order of magnitude, removing yet another obstacle to the use of theoretical results in practice. Our methods apply to any protocol based on circuit evaluation, including cryptographic multiparty protocols, two-party oblivious circuit evaluation, etc.. The advantage of circuit randomization over direct evaluation is proportional to the cost of multiplication vs. the cost of addition. Theoretically, the number of rounds can be reduced further by an O(log n) factor using the results of [l] . In practice, the choice whether to follow this route as well depends on just how large the O(1ogn) reduction is. The methods of [I] require multiplying three 3 x 3 matrices, which normally costs two multiplications, but which now costs 2 rounds (each matrix multiplication costs a round to correct the x-gates). Since the submission of this abstract, we have discovered an alternative to [I] that permits unbounded fan-in multiplication but suffers neither from expected round complexity (a complication that makes implementation difficult) nor from having to convert circuit layers to matrix products.
The RANDCIRCUIT protocol is, in many senses, simpler than direct circuit evaluation.
The initial processing is perhaps less than immediately intuitive, but it contains the same set of computations that must be done during direct circuit evaluation, parallelized and applied to random secrets. The only added complexity arises from creating random secrets at the start, but this subprotocol is easy relative to the one for multiplication. In fact, implementation is far easier than for direct circuit evaluation, since the body of thc protocol consists of reconstructions, which require simply a weak broadcast (all nonfaulty players broadcast their value, without Byzantine Agreement) from each player. A weak broadcast is far simpler to implement than a complicated multiplication subprotocol that itself contains private communications and Byzantine Agreement protocols. In asynchronous settings, using weak broadcast rather than interaction becomes a tremendous advantage, not just for efficiency but for correctness in implementation. Interestingly, because the steps of the protocol are reconstructions, error correction in the sense of zero-knowledge proofs of behavior is not needed. Error detection and correction is performed locally without interaction. Detection is simple: check whether received pieces interpolate to a degree-t polynomial. Correction uses a local BCH-errorcode correction, without interaction. Thus, the overhead of repeated proofs, cut-andchoose methods, or other interactive error detection techniques is not necessary after the first multiplication.
It is interesting to note that the randomization techniques used here apply to circuit evaluation in both the cryptographic and the noncryptographic settings. The techniques we present were inspired by a proof system for multilinear polynomials [2] that has a similarity to recent interactive proof systems for functions expressible as low-degree polynomials, perhaps suggesting deeper connections and a wider applicability than simply to cryptographic protocol optimization. In any case, the practical advantages are evident.
